Despite all this, I still do not favor a near-term withdrawal.
As you may or may not have heard, yesterday Rep. John Murtha, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, called for an immediate withdrawal from Iraq. He believes that our soldiers have become "a catalyst for violence" and should be brought home, presumably to sap the strength of the insurgency. If you read Nir Rosen's column that I talked about the other day, you'd see this is valid argument, and others besides Murtha have been making it for some time now. Still others believe that our soldiers cannot stabilize Iraq, and there's no point in them being there if that central goal is impossible to achieve. And still others have been opposed to the war from the beginning, and have called for withdrawal from nearly the minute our soldiers entered Iraq.
As I stated in my earlier post, despite Rosen's statement otherwise, I still do not believe that the insurgency will abate if our soldiers leave. The insurgents have made a point of targeting not only our soldiers, but Iraqi civilians and the Iraqi national government. Rosen argues that the Shiites are capable of defending themselves against the Sunni insurgents and foreign jihadists, but given the well-documented inability to train Iraqi units capable of fighting on their own, I don't see how it's possible for the national government to defend itself. To me it is not clear yet that Iraq is doomed to civil war, and since the Iraqi national government cannot yet defend itself, it falls to our soldiers to fight the insurgents until it can or it becomes clear that it cannot. I believe that whatever the pre-war arguments were, stability should be and is in fact our primary goal now.
But this isn't the only reason that I believe we should stay. I think that not only is Iraq's stability on the line here, but so is our credibility.
I know. It sounds absurd to talk about "credibility" at this point. We pissed away years worth of credibility in the way we went to war. How on Earth can we hope to salvage it now? And how is credibility a reason to fight a war anyway?
Despite the lies which predicated the invasion, and the ineptitude with which the occupation has been managed, most people would agree that we as a country are genuinely interested in a functioning democracy taking over in Iraq. This alone, and our good faith efforts to bring such a democracy about, is helping to restore the credibility we destroyed in invading Iraq. Now if Rosen is right, then democracy is in fact already doomed. To me then we are fighting to prevent a civil war which will kill many, many thousands more Iraqis then have died or will die at the hands us or the insurgency. To me this is also a worthy cause, even if we can't create democracy in Iraq.
To me then, the question becomes this: is civil war certain, despite our efforts? The issue of our credibility turns on the answer to this question. There is no doubt that if we leave Iraq, we are doing no less then abandoning the Iraqis to their fate. Whatever opponents of the war say, this would be the natural result of immediate withdrawal. To abandon the Iraqis before it becomes completely clear to us that we can do no more to help is in my mind pissing away what little credibility-and yes, honor-we've managed to hang onto in this mess. We undertook an obligation to the Iraqi people-Sunni, Shiite, Kurd or whoever-when we invaded Iraq and toppled Hussein, an obligation to stabilize the country and create a fair and just government for the Iraqi people. It is an obligation so great that we cannot release ourselves from us until it becomes absolutely certain that we can no longer fulfill it. To do otherwise is not only to me an immoral act as a nation, but it shows to the rest of the world that yet again, for all our talk of democracy and human rights, it is our own best interests that come above even our most solemn obligations. In this case it would be even more egregious because we created the instability in Iraq in the first place. And I do not believe that we have reached the point where we can say with certainty that there is nothing our soldiers can do to help create stability. Therefore, I cannot support immediate withdrawal.
Now I know that this invites comparisons to our approach in Vietnam, and to talk of "peace with honor." But there are important respects in which Iraq is not like Vietnam. By the time Nixon came to office, it was already clear that we could not win in Vietnam. We had been fighting there in significant numbers for the better part of five years, and advising the South Vietnamese and the French for nearly 20. And in all that time we had continued to prop up various South Vietnamese governments, one after the other, that were more inept, incompetent and undemocratic then the last. And Nixon's "Vietnamization" actually involved a widening of the war, into Cambodia. By the time the last of our forces left, we had long lost any chance to redeem ourselves in the conflict.
That's simply not the case in Iraq. We've only been in Iraq a little more then 2 1/2 years. The process of forming a national government is still in the formative stages. The insurgency in Iraq simply cannot compare to the insurgency in Vietnam, in either strength or goals. There's still time to create a capable Iraqi army, still time to bolster the national government, still time to help try to bring peace to Iraq.
What I do support are benchmarks for withdrawal. As the Iraqi national government grows more capable of defending itself, we should shift more of the fight against the insurgency to them, until there comes a time when the national government can do all of the fighting itself, or can fight with the aid of a mere token force on our part, with military and economic aid. This is akin to Nixon's "Vietnamization" approach. But the failure of that approach in Vietnam was in the application, not the concept. It's only reflects common sense that if we ourselves are unable to defeat the insurgency, then we should do our best to see that the Iraqis themselves are.
There are legitimate criticisms to this approach. The Bush administration may create arbitrary benchmarks that may or may not be met. Benchmarks may become excuses-not justifications-to leave. Benchmarks may not be able to reflect real, measurable progress in Iraq. And whether or not stability is even possible, benchmarks or not, is the big argument.
And yet I cannot bring myself to believe that the time has come to bring our soldiers home, and leave the Iraqis to sort out this mess for themselves. We were wrong to invade Iraq. We would be just as wrong to leave before we've done everything we possibly can to create a stable country there.
2 comments:
I try to think about this issue without giving in to the knee-jerk reaction that since the war was wrong, this occupation is wrong. Even if I feel that way, it's a cheap argument when giving up now may mean the loss of many tens of thousands more Iraqi lives.
And yet in all honesty, I can't see how us staying there for a longer time makes our chances of success any greater. The one thing that must happen is for a stable Iraqi national force to arise. One that can do the job and won't defect en masse whenever the going gets tough. However, we've ample evidence that the creation of such a force is not going well. We're not substantially closer now to being able to let the Iraqi national guard take over than we were two years ago.
On the other issues, I agree that the American presence is not the only thing fueling the insurgency, and I don't think it would abate significantly simply because of our leaving. However, you can't be blind to the fact that many insurgents started figthing because of our occupation.
I don't know if that necessarily means that if we left they'd lay their guns down, but I do know that means that as long as we're there they won't lay their guns down.
I do think we owe it to the Iraqi people to see that they are given a stable democracy. We owe them a lot more than that too. But you have to question whether we can actually achieve it using current methods.
The problem becomes one of money and men. If our occupation only required 2,000 men, and 10 billion dollars a year, there would be grumbling, but not this push for wholesale pullout. I'm not arguing that because of financial reasons we should pull out, but by God, we may not be able to afford to stay there. I mean, we will not be able to maintain those kinds of troop levels for much longer. Very soon there is going to be a big draw-down. This is inevitable. The question is what we can hope to achieve as our forces their shrink.
I wish that the Bush administration would be humble enough to apologize to the world and beg forgiveness, and then go make some deals with Arab countries to get them to help out in Iraq. Realistically, we need at least 3 times the men over there that we have. America doesn't have the capacity to produce that.
Basically, I see it as this: if we can't get outside help, in two years our forces will be ineffective in Iraq anyway. If the Iraqi National Guard cannot be trustred as an effective force at that point, there will be nothing we can do to stop the disentegration of Iraq unless by some miracle the Arab world or UN intervenes.
Therefore I think it boils down to this: we'll be leaving Iraq in large numbers soon anyway. The only question is whether Iraq will be self-sufficient enough to start taking over operations from us by then. I can't guess as to whether they will be or not, but they haven't shown a lot of progress thus far. I don't think that because of ideology we can say that we must stay or we must pull out. As I stated before, I think it's all a matter of practicality.
First off-and I meant to say this in the post-this represents only my opinion on Iraq. I don't claim to speak for the other two contributors to this blog, and I know all three of us differ to some degree on our thinking on this issue. And there's nothing wrong with that either. I think it's worth remembering that our bitterest opposition should be reserved for Republicans, not each other, now matter how much we may differ on Iraq. That being said...
I think the thing I hate the most about my standard, is that it is impossible for regular people like us to know whether or not the one factor it depends on-stability-is even possible or not. There are experts in and out of the government who disagree on this, so how are we supposed to know? I think in large part, once even the staunchest proponents of staying begin to say there's no chance for success, then that's when we should leave. Right now it seems to me that there are intelligent and experienced people who sincerely believe that stability is still possible. There are also intelligent and experienced people who believe it is not. To me then, once a majority of "experts" on Iraq begin saying we can't create stability, then it's time to begin planning a withdrawal without benchmarks.
For me, it's just impossible to get over the moral issue at stake here. Our obligation to the Iraqis demands the greatest sacrifice of us.
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