1. Withdrawing would ignite a civil war:
"No. That civil war is already under way—in large part because of the American presence. The longer the United States stays, the more it fuels Sunni hostility toward Shiite "collaborators." Were America not in Iraq, Sunni leaders could negotiate and participate without fear that they themselves would be branded traitors and collaborators by their constituents."
2. It would embolden the insurgency:
"No. If the occupation were to end, so, too, would the insurgency. After all, what the resistance movement has been resisting is the occupation. Who would the insurgents fight if the enemy left? When I asked Sunni Arab fighters and the clerics who support them why they were fighting, they all gave me the same one-word answer: intiqaam—revenge."
3. The foreign-elements of the insurgency would be empowered:
"The foreign jihadi element—commanded by the likes of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—is numerically insignificant; the bulk of the resistance has no connection to al-Qaeda or its offshoots... But what Zarqawi wants fundamentally conflicts with what Iraqi Sunnis want: Zarqawi seeks re-establishment of the Muslim caliphate and a Manichean confrontation with infidels around the world, to last until Judgment Day; the mainstream Iraqi resistance just wants the Americans out."
4. The goal of democracy in Iraq would be undermined:
"Give it up. It's not going to happen."
I agree that the civil war is underway. I agree that we are long, long way from democracy in Iraq-decades at best, if at all-and that nothing we're doing over there right now is really contributing to it. And I agree that the foreign elements would be undermined if we left. But I just find it hard to believe that the insurgency will be sapped of nearly all of it's strength simply if we leave. Rosen has been to Iraq, has spoken to Sunni and Shiite leaders there, and arrived at his conclusions, and it's hard to question the breadth of his knowledge and personal experience. But it's impossible for me to imagine that if we left, the mostly native Sunni elements of the insurgency won't turn themselves on the government in Baghdad. At one point in his column, Rosen says "the preponderance of power now lies with the majority Shiite"; if he means political power that's certainly true. But it's the question of military power that catches me short. I just don't see how the national government is supposed to prop itself up when we're hearing reports nearly every week about how few Iraqi units are actually read to take the field against the insurgents. In this very edition of the Atlantic, James Fallows talks about how at the time of writing his column, there's only one Iraqi unit capable of taking the field without any logistical or firepower support from our soldiers. One unit does not bespeak to me a government that is prepared to fend off the insurgency on it's own. If that is in fact the case, it seems to me that we have no choice but to stay as long as it takes for the Iraqi government to field a fully outfitted army that can fight the insurgency on it's own, not only to preserve it's existence, but to eventually prevail. As for his last point about democracy...sadly, I have no choice but to agree with that. Had we entered into Iraq fully prepared to rebuild society, with the intent to stay in Iraq for decades, we might have been able to hope for that. But democracy in Iraq, true democracy, died in the weeks of looting that followed the liberation.
As I've stated before, I'm neither firmly for staying in Iraq indefinitely, nor am I firmly against withdrawing, once it becomes obvious that it's futile to stay. I think our only choice is to weigh the evidence as best we can, and call it as best as we see it. To me, the necessity of staying until the Iraqi government can defend itself still seems evident.
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