Although a prolonged standoff with Iran over its nuclear program would pose significant problems for Western countries, including a probable rise in oil prices, the benefits of preventing a nuclear Iran would clearly outweigh the costs. We'd like to try to dispel some common myths on the subject.
They discuss economic sanctions first, and the myth that they would hurt the West more than they would hurt Iran:
But while Iran holds the world's second-largest reserves of oil and gas and is the fourth-largest oil producer, it is in fact a net importer of refined oil products, including gasoline. And internal consumption of oil products in Iran is growing by 5.2 percent a year, far faster than its ability to increase refining capacity. This means that the levels of imports necessary to make the Iranian economy function will only increase over time. Thus, sanctions that prevented Iran from importing, say, refined oil products, including gasoline, could bring its economy to a grinding halt. Perhaps more important, the subsequent shortages would disproportionately affect President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political base, the urban underclass and lower-middle class, as well as the military.
Myth 2 is the belief that Russia and China will never go along with sanctions:
Russia has little strategic interest in supporting the Iranian cause. While it may see Iran as a useful tool for balancing U.S. power in the Middle East, it has far more to fear from Iran's nuclear program in the long term than does the United States or Europe...While playing the role of honest broker between Iran and the West certainly suits the Putin administration's goals of raising Russian prestige and influence, policymakers in Moscow are realistic about the challenges presented by Iran to Russia's long-term interests.
The Chinese are also unlikely to stand in the way of a serious sanctions regime, particularly if forced to do so alone. While China has committed to substantial investments in Iran's oil and gas sector, it is unlikely to jeopardize its relationship with the United States and the European Union over the issue. Beijing also believes that while it should certainly let its views be known on important geopolitical issues, it is not yet ready to single-handedly resist the combined pressure of Western nations on an issue they consider of vital strategic importance to them.
And myth 3? The assumption that Iran will respond irrationally to any threat of sanctions:
One of the most dangerous assumptions about Iran is that it is acting irrationally or is led by people who do not calculate the potential costs and benefits of their actions.But in fact, while one can challenge the logic that leads the Iranian leadership to seek nuclear weapons in the first place, the Iranians have acted with complete rationality in seeking to achieve their objectives.
For example, Iran has been careful to escalate this crisis slowly over the past two years, engaging in protracted talks with the "E.U. Three."
Iran's seeming brinkmanship, relative, for example, to the actions of North Korea, another aspiring nuclear power, stems not from irrationality but from a sense that the country has far more leverage over the West because of its oil wealth.
While it is possible to disagree with the authors over details such as exactly how much the sanctions would hurt Iran vs. the West, or how willing the Chinese are to support Iran, those are minor quibbles compared to the relative truth of the myth-busting that they're doing in their column. The stakes in this contest with Iran over nuclear weapons are certainly high, but it is crucially important to remember that we are not limited to two options-give in or strike-and there is room for maneuver and negotiation. Given how poorly our assumptions served us in Iraq, it is crucial to get it right this time.
1 comment:
Well, I certainly hope they are right!
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