British Muslims Compelled to Inform

Contrary to claims that detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay hold the "worst of the worst" of terrorist masterminds, it appears that American officials not only have captured men who appear to have done no wrong, but have deliberately transferred to Gitmo men who they knew were not involved in terrorist plots, merely to compel them to provide information on someone who might have connections to terrorists:

As they tried to board a flight at Gatwick Airport in November 2002, three Arab residents of Britain were pulled aside by security agents. Police had questions about their luggage and ties to a radical Islamic cleric. After four days in custody, the men were cleared of suspicion and resumed their trip.

But British intelligence officials weren't ready to drop their interest in the men. Before the three flew out of the country, the MI5 security service sent cables to a "foreign intelligence agency," according to court testimony and newly declassified MI5 documents, calling the men Islamic extremists and disclosing their destination: Gambia, a tiny West African country.

When they arrived on Nov. 8, they were detained by Gambian and U.S. intelligence operatives, who interrogated them again, this time for a month, British and U.S. documents show. Then two of the men, Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna, disappeared into the netherworld of the U.S. government's battle against terrorism, taken first to a prison in Afghanistan, then to the Naval detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The primary purpose of this elaborate operation, documents and interviews suggest, was not to neutralize a pair of potential terrorists -- authorities have offered no evidence that they were planning attacks -- but to turn them into informers.

Rawi, 38, and Banna, 43, remain at Guantanamo. They have told their attorneys that U.S. and British intelligence operatives have visited them repeatedly there and in Afghanistan, renewing demands that they inform, offering them freedom and money in exchange. Both men say they have refused.

If you read the article in full, you'll see that these are two men who have only a loose affiliation with a Muslim cleric in London suspected of having ties to terrorists. Both men were approached repeatedly by British Intelligence and cajoled/coerced/harassed in an effort to get them to infiltrate extremist circles on their behalf.

Rawi agreed to become an unpaid informer, according to the family and his attorneys, a claim that the British government has acknowledged in court without elaborating. Although he kept details of his talks with MI5 to himself, British agents quickly became a presence at the family's house. They telephoned so often that his relatives complained, forcing MI5 to give him a mobile phone and meet him elsewhere.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, Banna also received a visit from two intelligence agents, one British and one American, according to his wife, Sabah. The agents inquired about [Muslic cleric] Qatada. He resisted their pressure to become an informer, she said, but they kept it up.

The treatment they got at the hands of the British would be genial compared to what they recieved in the hands of American agents:

Gambian officials initially said there was a visa problem. But the men were soon locked up and moved to hidden locations and safe houses around the capital. American spies acted as if they were in charge, Wahab al-Rawi said. A brawny man who identified himself as Lee and said he was from the U.S. Embassy spent days questioning the men. He wanted to know about their ties to Qatada, whether the peanut business was a front for terrorist activities and whether they hated Americans. Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna were flown to Afghanistan.

They have given their attorneys this account of their arrival there: They were taken to a prison near Kabul, the capital, and kept in the darkness for two weeks, with loudspeakers blaring music around the clock. Later they were transferred to a prison at Bagram air base.

A few weeks later, they were flown to Guantanamo Bay.

To summarize: these guys aren't terrorists. They aren't even suspected of being terrorists. Nor are they suspected of having ties to terrorists, or of in anyway having a desire to affiliate with terrorists. Rather, they are men with a loose affiliation to a man who is suspected of having ties to terrorists. Nonetheless:

In September 2004, the two were brought before tribunals that would determine whether they could be formally classified as "enemy combatants." The primary evidence against them: they knew Abu Qatada, and had wired money on his behalf to Jordan.

In testimony during the hearings, the detainees admitted knowing Qatada and helping him transfer the funds, which they said went to a charity. They said MI5 had been aware of all their activities and had encouraged them to interact with Qatada. They also pointed out that British police had them in custody just prior to their trip to Gambia and could have pressed charges if they were suspected of illegal acts.

The tribunals ruled that both men should be classified as enemy combatants.

So they were locked up not for what they did, but for who they knew. Whatever use they could even be to the British or us is now completely gone, given that certainly any terrorists-even if they don't read the Post-would be a little suspicious as to why these two disappeared for a few years before popping back up in London wanting to chat with them again. So, even if you could justify that it's okay to compel men who have committed no wrong-doing to work for us-which it's not-even that justification for holding them is lost. So why are they still there? Almost certainly they're there for the same reason that dozens more whom we are sure are innocent are still there. Because it would be an embarassment to let them go.

As for these tribunals that Bush administration officials and apologists keep touting; well, I think this gives us an idea of exactly what sort of kangaroo courts they've put together down there. Arguments for Hamdan are over, but I think even a busy Supreme Court justice might wonder if this is the sort of thing the Bush administration thinks the Court was referring to in the Hamdi decision when they said the detainees must have a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention. By this standard, we could lock up police informants for any actions they undertake to aid the police.

The travesty that is Gitmo continues.