Influencing the Shiites

All of the plans currently being talked about for either getting out of or staying in Iraq have one element in common: getting the Shiites to accept a place for the Sunnis in the government. The Bush administration, as we've seen recently, appears to be taking this recommendation to heart:

In recent weeks there has been stepped-up pressure on Iraq's Shiite leaders, including strong statements about the dangers posed by Shiite militias, less-than-subtle discouragement of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari's bid to keep his post and accusations against Iraq's Shiite-ruled neighbor, Iran, of fomenting instability.

A joint U.S.-Iraqi army raid last month on a religious and political complex in Baghdad, which included an office of Jafari's Dawa party and an alleged hide-out for a Shiite militia, further inflamed the rift. Some Shiite leaders have complained openly of betrayal by the United States and compared the recent U.S. diplomatic stance to the Americans' refusal to actively support an abortive Shiite uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991.

"There's lots of talks in the street and among politicians who see that lately the Americans are hard on the Shiites and favoring the Sunnis by rewarding them and hoping they are going to lay down their weapons and stop being the resistance. There is fear and concern," said Adnan Ali Kadhimi, an adviser to Jafari.

Some think by this route we can begin drawing down our forces by the end of the year. Others think it'll take a lot longer. Regardless of the time, this approach is one that we must take if we intend to stabilize Iraq, for two reasons. One, it saps the insurgency of its strength as Sunnis begin to realize that our presence is the only thing keeping hard-line Shiites from going on a rampage with their "death squads." Two, as the Shiites realize that we are in fact willing to side with the Sunnis on this larger question of their political participation, and that we are serious about abandoning them to fight the insurgency as best they can if they don't accede to our requests, sidelines those same hard-liners in favor of moderate.

However, this is a very delicate balance. At the same time as Sunni insurgents are killing our soliders, our diplomats our advocating for their political participation. At the same time that we're doing our best to protect Shiite civilians from the endless bombings and assassinations, we're raiding the compounds of Shiite militias and killing their fighters.

Either way, it makes it more clear that we are the "power broker" in Iraq, and that our presence is the only thing that can keep a cap on the conflict currently raging and perhaps someday bring it to an end. Whether that's likely, unlikely or hopeless is an argument that continues.